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An Examination and Evaluation of Carlos Menem's First Term 
as President(1989.95) and the Democratic 
ComoHdation Process in Argentina 
Danny Grooms 
Historical Overview of Argentina: 1946-1983 
Argentina, once just another Latin American nation struggling to claim its 
place among the more developed nations of the Northern Hemisphere, is now one of 
I 
I 
the most developed nations in what was once called the "third world". 
Development comes in many forms, and any evaluation must take into account not 
only economic development, but political and social development as well. 
Argentina's recently implemented free market economy, while definitely having its 
difficulties, is but one example of the nation's remarkable turnaround. It is 
Argentina's political system, which may be approaching status as a full-fledged 
democracy, that provides a quite impressive example of progress. The greatest 
evidence for this is not necessarily where the countIy is in its development when 
considered alone but when taken in the context of where it was just fifteen years 
ago and the precarious position in which it found itself only eight short years ago. 
Although this paper will seek to examine and evaluate the last eight years of 
progress and development in Argentina, such an effort would be inadequate without 
providing a historical context and a foundation with which to begin. 
To examine Argentina before 1946 would be to place too much enlphasis on 
the past for this subject, but any historical discussion of the countIy must at least 
begin in that year. February 1946, Juan Peron was elected President of Argentina. 
Peron, former Vice-President and Secretary of Labor simultaneously, won a 
military-supervised election with the massive support of the working class (Palermo 
09 Oct 1996). He had been imprisoned the previous October 9 by military officials 
who opposed him and feared his supporters but was released on October 17, 1945, 
when hundreds of thousands of those supporters gathered in the Plaza de Mayo to 
protest his imprisonment (Snow 13). For nearly the next thirty years, Peron would 
effect a direct influence on Argentine politics, and though he is long dead, his name 
still has great influence in the political realm of Argentina. 
Peron, along with his wildly popular wife Eva (recently portrayed by 
Madonna in the controversial, biographical film, Evita), became a hero to the 
working class. Though the working class received many benefits from the Peron 
government of the next ten years, the greatest change was in its involvement in 
politics. Peronism united the lower class with its populist message and actively 
encouraged that sector of the nation to participate in elections and the political 
process. Those of the working class have played a huge role in evety election since, 
even when they were prohibited from voting as they wished. 
Peron's pro-labor policies worked well for the fIrst few years of his fIrst term 
as wages increased in relation to prices and housing prices dropped; however, 
toward the end of the 1940's, Argentina's national reserves disappeared and 
industrial progress slowed. The end of the economic boom caused Peron to have to 
cut back on industrialization and wealth redistribution plans (Baily 6). His 
government also moved more and more toward authoritarian rule as he altered the 
constitution to permit a second term in 1951 and restricted freedoms and civil 
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liberties (Snow 14). At the same time, Eva Peron died of breast cancer, and the 
Peronist monopoly of power began to weaken. By 1955, Peron had lost the support 
of the Church, and most sectors of the military fiercely opposed him; he was 
overthrown in a coup in September, 1955, and replaced by a military government 
(Snow 14). 
The leader of the coup, General Lonardi, took over immediately thereafter. 
He lasted only a very short time and was replaced by General Aramburu in 
November of the same year. This "Revoluci6n Libertadura" was composed of the 
Church, the upper class, the middle class, and the military (Gaiano 02 Sept 1996). 
Not all, however, were in agreement as to what should be done in the wake of ten 
years of Peronism. Some, like Lonardi, thought there could be cooperation between 
the former Peron supporters and the new government, but other groups fell farther 
to the right, led by Aramburu, and believed that Peronism had to be eradicated and 
the political process cleansed of any traces of Peron's years in power (Snow 14). 
The fierce anti-Peron factions won out over their less repressive counterparts, and 
Peronism was made illegal. Peron went into exile, and any organization or political 
activity of Peron supporters was banned. The military ruled as custodians of the 
government until 1958 when a presidential election was held. 
In 1958, with the Peronists banned from participating as Peronists, the old 
Union Civica Radical split into two factions and ran against each other for the 
presidency. The Intransigente candidate, Arturo Frondizi, easily won the election, 
-3-
but he did so based on a deal made with Peron, though Peron was not allowed in the 
country (Baily 2). Frondizi received the backing of Peron and his supporters in 
Argentina in return for the promise to legalize Peronism (Snow 14). Frondizi was 
not able to govern effectively thereafter because of the crippling effect of the 
Peronistlanti-Peronist attitude on national politics. The anti-Peronists knew 
Frondizi had received the support and backing of Peron and saw his government as 
a front for the Peronist forces in the country. The Peronists, on the other hand, felt 
betrayed by Frondizi, because his administration did not move quickly enough to 
warrant the overwhelming support they had given him in the elections. Frondizi 
was caught in the power struggle and left with no options that could please both his 
supporters and those who could remove him from power. 
Frondizi had to fear the power of the nrilitary which was constantly 
threatening another overthrow should the civilian government prove unacceptable or 
incapable of governing by its standards. During the early 1960's, the world climate 
was changing dramatically. Cuba had been overthrown and became Communist. 
The United States was attempting to exclude them from the Organization of 
American States, but Frondizi would not agree to join the USA in the fight against 
Cuba; however, he was forced to break off relations with the country in Februaty, 
1962, after the militaty threatened to revolt should he continue to "support" 
Communism in Cuba (Gaiano 02 Sept). Also in 1962, Frondizi allowed the 
Peronist party to participate in congressional and provincial elections as he had 
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promised to do. 
In elections where the Peronist party was banned, massive numbers of blank 
ballots had been turned in as a form of protest. When the Peronists were allowed 
back into the political process, they won practically everywhere, but most 
importantly, a Peronist candidate, Framini, was elected governor of the Buenos 
Aires province, the most populous in the entire nation (Gaiano 02 Sept). The 
militaty considered this unacceptable and attempted to use its influence to have the 
elections declared invalid. During this period, in March, 1962, Frondizi resigned, 
and Guido, a pawn of the military became interim President (Gaiano 02 Sept). The 
military was split at this point between factions that supported a civilian government 
and groups that believed a military dictatorship was the only answer to Argentina's 
problems. Elections were held in July, 1963, but the Peronists were banned once 
again from taking part. They repeated the process of voting "en blanco", casting 
blank ballots, which accounted for more than twenty-one percent of the total vote, 
while Arturo Illia won under the Union Civica Radical del Pueblo banner with 
twenty-five percent of the vote (Baily 2). 
The basis of the continued support for Peronism was the strength of the labor 
unions. Although many attempts had been made to destroy their power and 
organization, these "sindicatos" still exercised much influence in the political realm. 
In response to their continued exclusion from the political process, the General 
Confederation of Labor (CGT), under the leadership of Augusto Vandor, formulated 
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the Plan de Lucha to fight against the government with multiple general strikes and 
protests (Snow 90). Under this pressure and in a genuine attempt to legitimize the 
Argentine political process, Illia permitted the Peronists, under the name Union 
Popular, to participate in congressional elections once again. The Peronists 
duplicated their previous victories and dominated the elections with more than 
thirty-five percent of the national vote (Baily 2). 
The Azules, a faction of the military that had supported elections in previous 
years, were furious and frustrated that the Peronists won every time they were 
permitted to run their own candidates (Baily 9). Juan Carlos Ongania, the head of 
the army, left his position to start a military coup. He brought together the Azules 
and the other military faction, the Colorados, and this newly united armed forces 
overthrew the Illia administration on June 28, 1966, and placed Ongania at the head 
of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state (Gaiano 09 Sept). 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state, BA as it is termed by Guillermo 
O'Donnell in his book Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, is a distinct form of 
authoritarian regime which came into existence in Argentina, as well as other Latin 
American nations, in the 1960's and 70's. Entire books have been written defining 
BA, so an in-depth explanation of it is impossible and impractical, but the following 
characteristics, as described by 0 'Donnell, will hopefully provide a concise, 
working defInition of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. ( 1) The "principal 
social base" of the regime is the "upper bourgeoisie"; (2) two types of organizations 
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have a great deal of power and influence, those who specialize in coercion and seek 
to restore "order" and those whose main function is to "nonnalize" the economy; (3) 
a previously active popular sector is excluded from the political process; (4) 
political access, political democracy, and the rights of citizenship are thus 
suppressed; (5) economic exclusion accompanies the political exclusion and 
worsens economic inequalities; (6) technical logic and a "depoliticized", 
unemotional approach is taken to social issues; (7) democratic channels are closed 
and access is limited to those at the "apex of large organizations" like the anned 
forces, the bureaucracy, and the largest businesses (O'Donnell 32). 
In Argentina, there were three divisions within the military at the time of the 
institution of the "Gobierno Revoluci6n Argentina", as it was named (Gaiano 09 
Sept). The liberals, mostly big business and those with international connections, 
believed Argentina's economy should use foreign investment to generate growth. 
The nationalists differed greatly on this issue and believed the government and the 
country should be run and supported without foreign investment and independent of 
foreign influence. The paternalists, like Ongania, were technocrats who believed 
the military was the caretaker of the country and must guide Argentina out of its 
troubles even if harsh measures were required (Gaiano 09 Sept). The paternalists 
came into power, and the liberals shared that power in the economic spectrum. 
These two forces would control Argentina and the BA state. With a liberal as the 
Minister of Economy, Krieger Vasena, and a paternalist at the helm, Ongania, 
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Argentina fonnulated a ten-year plan that was said to be preparing the country for 
constitutional democracy (Baily 9). 
The effective result of the frrst stage of this process, the economic stage, was 
to stabilize the economy at the expense of the working and middle classes by 
cutting government services and freezing wages while repressing strikes and 
attempting to break the backs of the unions (Baily 10). As the working class 
suffered, it mobilized under the leadership of the CGT and Vandor. General strikes 
and protests became more common. By 1969, the situation had become intolerable 
to the average Argentine. On May 29, 1969, in Cordoba, what began as a massive 
expression of discontent turned into a week-long uprising (Snrith 128). This 
Cordobazo, as it has been called, was a general protest against the Ongania 
government as well as a more specific attack on the painful economic measures 
being adopted by Vasena, including an increase by four hours in the workweek 
(Smith 128). The military had to be called in to quell the rebellion. As a result of 
this uprising, Vasena resigned in July of that year, and the Ongania government 
appeared doomed to the same fate as those it had replaced, being overthrown 
(Gaiano 09 Sept). 
The next year, Ongania resigned and was replaced by General Levingston a 
nationalist. Levingston was in power for only ten short months as his effort to 
change the direction of the BA regime to a more nationalist government was 
"abandoned even sooner and more decisively than its predecessor." (O'Donnell 
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188). During Ongania's fmal two years and the rule of Levingston, social disorder 
reached a drastic level. Guerrilla groups, such as the Montoneros and the People's 
Revolutionary Anny (ERP) gained strength and became so bold as to assassinate 
Aramburu, the fonner President and still a political player (Gaiano 09 Sept). In 
July, 1969, shortly after the Cordobazo, Vandor and Jose Alonso, the two chief 
labor leaders were assassinated, as well (Baily 10). The death penalty was enacted 
as punishment for "crimes against public order" shortly after Aramburu's kidnaping, 
but even such strict measures could not stem the tide of rebellion that was 
overwhelming the BA state in Argentina (O'Donnell 187). Levingston was replaced 
by Lanusse in March of 1971. Lanusse had no choice but to work in the direction of 
elections once again, since a large majority of the population was, by that point, 
opposed to military rule (Gaiano 09 Sept). 
The Lanusse regime permitted the reactivation of political parties, all of 
which had been outlawed since 1966. The announced plan was a "Great National 
Alliance" which would unite all groups towards the common goal of 
"democratization", but such a coalition would include the military and guarantee its 
continued influence in the political sphere (Baily 11). The attempt was also planned 
to weaken the Peronist stronghold on the political process whenever permitted to 
participate. In a remarkable show of unity and faithfulness to the ideals of 
democracy, all parties agreed to refuse any elections that excluded any political 
party, including the Justicialist Party, the Peronists. This pact, called "The Hour of 
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the People" guaranteed that any election held would be open and include a Peronist 
candidate (Gaiano 09 Sept). The fmal agreement between the military and the 
political parties was that the Peronists could participate, but Peron, who was still 
living in exile, was not allowed to be a candidate. Peron then returned to Argentina 
on November 17, 1972, and was greeted by hundreds of thousands of supporters at 
Ezeiza International Airport outside Buenos Aires (Gaiano 09 Sept). 
Peron's return signaled a death knell for the military government. He 
organized the lusticialist Liberation Front (FREJULI) to unite a broad spectrum of 
political parties and tapped Hector Campora as his hand-picked candidate for 
President (Smith 215). The radicals selected Ricardo Balbin as their candidate for 
President in a hopeless attempt to compete with the Peronist juggernaut (Gaiano 09 
Sept). Campora, the FREJlTLI candidate, easily won the election in March of 1973. 
His ticket received 49.6% of the vote, just .4% less than the fifty percent needed to 
avoid a runoff election, but with Balbin placing second with only twenty-one 
percent of the vote, Campora was declared the winner without a runoff (Smith 219). 
Campora had served as President for only two months after taking office in May 
when he and his vice president offered their resignations. They knew, as the vice 
governor of Buenos Aires Province had stated, that "With Peron in the country, no 
one else can be the President of the Argentines except him." (Smith 227). New 
elections were held in September of 1973, and the ticket of Peron-Peron (his second 
wife, Isabel, was named as the vice presidential candidate) easily crushed the 
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opposition with sixty-two percent of the popular vote (Baily 2). Peron had returned 
and was once again President of Argentina. His influence had culminated in a 
return to power and the defeat of the political enemies who had removed him 
eighteen years prior. 
Peron's return was triumphant, but his third tenn as President would not be. 
He died in July, 1974, in the midst of political and economic tunnoil. Peron 
clashed with the Montoneros and other leftist groups who had supported him before 
the elections but received none of the benefits for which they had hoped (Gaiano 09 
Sept). The Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) was fonned by Peron's 
Minister of Social Welfare, Jose Lopez Rega, to combat these revolutionary groups 
but only added to the chaotic state of affairs (Smith 228). The economy had not 
recovered and had, in fact, worsened in the face of oil price increases and industry's 
refusal to participate in price freezes (Smith 229). Isabel Peron ascended to the 
Presidency, a position for which she was totally unprepared. Her government was 
mismanaged from beginning to end and lacked the authority and power to enforce 
its own policies (Smith 229). The country spiraled out of control, and the economy 
plummeted as organized labor demanded and received wage hikes and industry and 
big business raised prices. The result was uncontrollable inflation that pushed 
Argentina to the brink of economic collapse and the intervention of the military led 
by Jorge Videla on March 24, 1976 (Smith 230). 
When the military junta of Videla, Massera, and Agosti came to power, 
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many Argentines were glad to be rid of the chaotic nongovernance of the past three 
years; however, few could have predicted the lengths to which this new 
government, under the leadership of de facto President Jorge Videla, would go. 
Political parties were once again banned, and civil liberties were suspended as the 
junta proclaimed its goals of returning Argentina to the state it existed in before 
Peronism and ending subversive terrorism (Gaiano 16 Sept). Secret police groups 
were fonned to make political enemies or suspected subversives "disappear". This 
technique of kidnaping individuals on the street or in their homes and taking them 
to secret detention centers such as the "Campo de Mayo" in Buenos Aires, where 
they were tortured or killed, sometimes by being pushed out of cargo planes flying 
over the Atlantic Ocean with their hands and feet bound, was a particularly effective 
fonn of government-sponsored terrorism that eliminated potential threats while 
striking fear into the friends and relatives of those taken (Gaiano 16 Sept). The 
government could conveniently claim that it had nothing to do with the right wing 
paramilitary groups it claimed were committing these atrocious crimes, but it is 
estimated more than thirty thousand individuals were abducted, tortured, and killed 
during this "Dirty War" (Gaiano 16 Sept). 
The economic policies of the ruling junta were strictly neo-liberal. Under 
the guidance of Martinez de Hoz, the "New Political Economy" was set into action, 
and severe liberal actions were taken including reducing real wages and cutting 
government welfare programs (Smith 235). The basis for the new economy was to 
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remove government controls on prices and protections of domestic enterprises in 
order to permit serious foreign competition. The economy did not recover under the 
plan put forth by Martinez de Hoz, and by 1981, the economic situation was more 
dire than it had ever been (Smith 242). Roberto Viola took over in March, 1981, 
according to the succession that had been planned in 1976 (Smith 242). The 
economy, in total collapse, was plagued by inflation of more than ten percent per 
month and a skyrocketing foreign debt, and Viola left office shortly thereafter in 
December of the same year (Gaiano 16 Sept). He was replaced by Leopoldo 
Galtieri. 
Argentina's economy had been growing weaker for several years, but in the 
frrst few years of the 1980's, it reached a disastrous level. The annual Gross 
Domestic Product had gone from a stagnant. 9% level of growth in the 70's to 
negative 2.5% in the 80's (de la BaIze 49). Between 1980 and 1983, average 
unemployment grew to 5.2% while average annual inflation ballooned to 178.5% 
(de la Baize 51). As inflation grew, the real wages of workers shrunk causing a 
severe downturn in the level of revenue that could be generated by the government. 
By 1983, the government was only collecting 43% in taxes of the amount it was 
spending (Ferrer 17). The foreign debt grew to $45 billion, and as international 
interest rates rose, Argentina became incapable of making payments on that debt (de 
la Baize 53). Foreign investment, which had propped up a military government that 
was spending more than it could generate in revenues, disappeared when Argentina 
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became a risky investment. Thus, any Argentine government would be crippled by 
high debts, rampant inflation, and no likely sources of investment. 
The military junta was suffering a severe lack of credibility by this point. 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo convened weekly to protest for the release of 
information pertaining to their children and grandchildren who had disappeared 
(Gaiano 16 Sept). The economy and divisions within the military also plagued the 
junta. Even on political-military issues, the government had failed. In the Beagle 
Channel dispute with Chile, Argentina had lost in arbitration as well as mediation 
by Pope John Paul II that prevented a war between the two neighboring countries 
(Gaiano 16 Sept). The junta was badly in need of a victory to unite the people 
behind a failing government. The naval forces, represented by Massera in the junta, 
were especially stung by the loss of the islands Picton, Lennox, and Nueva in the 
Beagle Channel and focused on the Islas Malivinas (F alkland Islands), occupied by 
the British, which had long been a thorn in the side of the Argentine armed forces 
(Gaiano 16 Sept). 
On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces invaded the islands and took them back 
without killing a single British soldier, not that there was a large contingent 
stationed on the islands. On April 3, the United Nations Security Council voted to 
condemn the action, with only China and the USSR abstaining from the vote and 
the United States, France, and of course, Great Britain backing the condemnation 
(Gaiano 16 Sept). Galtieri and the ruling junta had made two crucial errors in 
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planning the takeover. They had expected the United States to support the action by 
remaining neutral on the issue, and they had not expected Great Britain to react 
strongly to the takeover, especially not with military retaliation (Gaiano 16 Sept). 
Negotiations took place, but Great Britain would only accept one solution, and that 
was the total removal of Argentine forces and the return of the islands to England. 
The military junta could not accept such a solution and save face, let alone achieve 
the brilliant military victory they needed to revive their government, so a military 
conflict ensued. Argentina was completely unprepared for a full-scale war with 
Great Britain whose forces had better training, more experience, and access to better 
technology. Still, the Argentines managed to sink one of the eighty-six ships sent 
by the English, and three hundred British were killed; the British responded by 
sinking the General Belgrano which accounted for almost half the approximately 
seven hundred Argentines who died in the short war (Gaiano 16 Sept). The ruling 
junta had mustered a nationalist movement in support of the action, and support for 
the government rose in a "rally around the flag" effect. Nothing, however, could 
prevent the crushing defeat at the hands of the British which would complete the 
invalidation of a military that had proven itself not only incapable of ruling but of 
waging a war, its main function. The "conflict" ended on June 14, 1982, after two 
months, with an exchange of prisoners of war (Gaiano 9 Sept). The military junta, 
led by Galtieri, could do nothing but turn power back over to a civilian government 
in total disgrace and defeat. 
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On July 1, 1982, Reynaldo Bignone took over as President for the resigning 
Galtieri, but his rule was that of a transition toward new elections. Political parties 
were once again pennitted to become active, but allowed the military to set the pace 
for the transition to democratic elections, and elections were set for and held on 
October 30, 1983 (Munck 104). This date marks the beginning of the transition 
process to democracy in Argentina. There have been no military coups since, and 
election have been held regularly and without major incident. Still, democracy can 
not be said to be safe at this point, as there were still many threats to its survival, the 
foremost among these being the economic crisis passed on to the democratically-
elected President by the outgoing military governnlent. 
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Alfonsin: 1983 -1989 
The two main parties competing for the Presidency in 1983 were the two 
traditional powerhouses of Argentine politics, the Union Civica Radical (VCR) and 
the Partido Justicialista (PJ). The PJ had discredited itself entirely by 1976, yet it 
still had strong backing. Italo Luder was the PJ candidate in 1983, and he was a 
bland candidate who did nothing to inspire the popular movements Peron had used 
so successfully to gain power (Gaiano 23 Sept). There were three distinct groups 
within the UCR party that competed for the nomination. The followers of Irigoyen, 
the Radical leader of the 1920's, formed the smallest segment of the party. Another 
group calling itself the Linea Nacional, were the followers of Balbin, and were led 
by De La Rua, the unsuccessful vice presidential candidate with Balbin in 1973. 
The largest group was led by Raul Alfonsin and called itself the Renewal and 
Change movement, which he had formed in 1972 (Munck 104). 
Alfonsin campaigned effectively by attacking the corruption of the P J. He 
alleged a pact between the military and the unions, heavy supporters of the PJ, 
which, though never proven, severely damaged the already weak reputation of the 
party (Gaiano 23 Sept). Alfonsin stressed progress and change, which appealed 
greatly to the suffering Argentines. When elections were held, the UCR gained 
power with a fifty-two to forty percent win over the P J (Munck 105). Thus, 
Argentine democracy was reborn. 
When Alfonsin took over, the transition to stable democracy began. Yet, 
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though the popular slogan was, "They're going, they're going, and never shall come 
back." when referring to the Argentine military in politics, the constitutionally-
elected President stood on quite shaky ground (Munck ii). The Radical government 
faced a gigantic external debt, runaway inflation, inefficient production, and 
shrinking revenues. He had been handed an economy in collapse. Still, Alfonsin's 
slogan of Participation, Modernization, and Social Justice rang true. He entered 
office with hopes of providing education for all as well as a program to build more 
than one million new houses (Gaiano 23 Sept). These challenges would have to 
wait, however, until the wild economy could be tamed. 
By the start of 1984, inflation rates had climbed still higher to 400% annually 
(de la Balze 51). On June 14, 1985, with ever-increasing pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund as well as other foreign investors for extreme action to 
salvage the economy, the Austral Plan was implemented (Smith 279). There were 
four fundamental steps to the new economic plan. The four instruments of economic 
refonn were as follows: 1. the Austral- a new currency to replace the Peso at a rate 
of 1 Austral for every 1000 Pesos with an 18% devaluation in currency versus the 
dollar; 2. general wage and price freezes; 3. increases in charges for government 
services such as electricity and transportation; 4. an attempt to control inflation by 
not printing excessive amounts of currency (Smith 280-1). Immediately following 
implementation of the plan, prospects were bright. Average inflation dropped from 
the 400% level to a more reasonable 20% during the last six months of 1985 (Smith 
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281). This apparent progress would not last, though, as the General Confederation 
of Labor and other organized labor groups, with the prodding of a revived Peronist 
party, demanded wage increases (Smith 281). When Alfonsin's government 
enacted these increases in early 1986, price hikes had to follow, and inflation began 
to increase once again. By the middle of the year, average annual inflation was 
approaching triple digits, and in the beginning of 1987, renewed freezes in prices 
and wages were enacted under the "Australito" (Smith 282). In 1986, the economy 
appeared to begin a recovery. Not only had inflation rates reached a ten-year low, 
but Gross Domestic Product had actually grown by 5.7%, the largest growth of the 
decade (Munck 112). 
During this period of attempted economic refonn, the Peronist party was 
looking for a means to regain political power. The party had invalidated itself in the 
previous decade through failed governments and secret agreements with the military 
governments. Carlos Menem became one of the' principal leaders of what was 
called the Peronist Renovation movement (Gaiano 23 Sept). By 1987, the 
Justicialist Party was back and regaining strength and support. Elections were held 
for governors and deputies, and the Justicialists received more popular votes than 
the Radicals for the first time in twenty-four years (Catterberg 101). There were 
many factors leading to this swing in political power. The largest was the failing 
economy; inflation had climbed back to 180% by election time (Smith 283). 
Alfonsin was caught in the middle with international investors applying 
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pressure to receive their interest payments and Justicialist-supported labor groups 
striking and protesting for increased wages and "social justice" (Gaiano 23 Sept). 
Alfonsin and his ministers had little choice but to agree to the harsh austerity 
measures of the IMF. These measures had little effect, though, as inflation 
skyrocketed in early 1988 leading to the Spring Plan of 1988 which again froze 
wages and prices as well as devaluing the Austral (Smith 284). Within a year, 
inflation was at an all-time high. In February and March of 1989, hyperinflation of 
several hundred percent per month struck a fmal blow to the Alfonsin economic 
planjust as presidential elections were approaching (Gaiano 30 Sept). 
If the economic pressures alone were not enough to bring down Alfonsin' s 
government, renewed threats from the military helped. By 1985, the Alfonsin 
government had tried and imprisoned five of the nine military junta members 
(Munck 122). This process would face threats to not carry through with severe 
punishments to military leaders, and the principle of Due Obedience had removed 
from danger of prosecution all those who "only followed orders" (Munck 122). In 
1987, under growing menace from the military, the law of Punto Final (Final Stop) 
was enacted as a concession to limit prosecutions (Smith 270). Still, certain 
factions of the military resented any attempt at retribution on the part of the civilian 
government, and the Easter rebellion of the Carapintadas (Painted Faces) soon 
followed (Smith 270). The popular perception that Alfonsin was giving in to 
military threats and protests through both the Due Obedience and Final Stop laws 
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were widespread (Gaiano 23 Sept). Alfonsin lost popularity and credibility on both 
fronts. 
As the elections of 1989 approached, Alfonsin had gained enemies even in 
the Church. His government had broached the taboo subject of legalized divorce 
which resulted in religious opposition (Gaiano 23 Sept). The Radical government 
had lost all chance of maintaining power into the 1990's. Carlos Menem had won 
the internal runoffs for the Peronist candidacy, and the Radicals put forth Angeloz, 
the governor of Cordoba, as their candidate, since no President could seek a second 
tenn under Argentina's constitution (Gaiano 30 Sept). Television and newspapers 
became the key means by which the candidates communicated their messages, and 
Menem, with his platform of "Renovation", a Productive Revolution, and Higher 
Salaries, was the more effective campaigner (Gaiano 30 Sept). In six years, the 
political fortunes had reversed themselves. Now, it was the Radical candidate who 
found himself running without a chance of winning. The vote reversed itself from 
the previous election, and Menem won with 4~1o of the vote to the Radicals' 37% 
(Catterberg 101). Argentina could now lay claim to a two-party system, since both 
opposing parties had now been elected to the highest office in consecutive elections. 
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1989-1995 and Beyond 
Is the Transition Complete? 
Four Criteria for Differentiating Transition Governments 
from Consolidating Democracies 
With the economic and political situation what it was, Alfonsin set about a 
planned renunciation of power rather than complete his entire term. He left office 
and handed the government over to Carlos Menem and the Partido Justicialista on 
July 8, 1989. (Gaiano 30 Sept). What followed was more than a second 
constitutionally-elected government. The transfer of power from one party to 
another, the stabilization of the political and economic situations in the country, and 
the overall strengthening of the democratic system in Argentina all marked the end 
of a transitional government and the beginning of a long path of democratic 
consolidation. Argentina is now in that period of consolidation, of moving toward 
true stability. The consolidation process does not imply invulnerability, rather it 
signifies a great deal of progress on the road to a stable, democratic system. The 
four criteria that follow offer one means of determining if the Argentine democracy 
is actually consolidating and if so, to what degree this consolidation has been 
accomplished. 
The first criteria that must be met to signify the end of a transition 
government is the diminishment of threat of an alternate form of government to the 
point that reversal to a previous form of government is not realistic. Until the 
country is safe from a return to the authoritarian style of government, the transition 
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cannot be said to have fmished. The second criteria pertains to the political arena 
and elections. Political competition must not only be petmitted, but it must occur 
within the system including two or more viable parties that can and do participate 
freely according to the accepted standards of that system. A single party system or 
a system where one party has an insunnountable advantage and thus, faces no 
challenge in elections cannot fit under the description of a consolidating democracy. 
Political activity outside the boundaries established in that country signifies 
weaknesses or disagreements among parties that have not or cannot be resolved and 
undennine any efforts to strengthen the system. The third requirement for a 
consolidating democracy is the stabilization of the economy. While all problems 
need not be resolved before the transitional period can be said to be complete, it 
must be possible to say the economy is manageable. In that way, economic 
strategies can be developed for the long-term rather than solely as responses to 
economic crises. Until this has occurred, neither the economic nor political system 
can be labeled as stable. 
The final criteria that signifies the end of the transition period and the 
ongoing process of consolidation is the shift of focus from primary to secondary 
problems. The primary problems were those faced by the transition government 
when it took over power from the previous regime. These must be at least partially 
resolved to the point where other problems are considered more pressing. 
Secondary problems are those that, directly or indirectly, result from the solutions 
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or strategies used to combat the primary problems. By defmition, the secondary 
problems cannot arise until primary issues have been dealt with to some extent. At 
that point, those new complications will develop, and the government must resolve 
these, as well. These problems are labeled secondary due to the sequence in which 
they appear, not their importance; however, this shift of focus, as long as it does not 
result in a loss of stability that undennines one of the previous three criteria, 
signifies the change from a transitional to a consolidating fonn of government. 
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Criteria 1 
The threat of an alternate fonn of 
government has decreased to the point that reversal 
to a previous system is not realistic. 
Between 1930 and 1983, Argentine politics have been dominated by military 
forces and influences. The most pertinent example is also the most recent. This is 
the regime of 1976-1983. The military junta of Videla, Massera, and Agosti was 
defmitely the most brutal government in Argentine history and did more to discredit 
the Argentine military than any other military regime. During their rule, it is 
estimated that between nine thousand and thirty thousand Argentines were killed 
(Husarska 12). The tenn used both as a noun to describe this group of people and 
as a verb to define what occurred to them is "disappeared" (Husarska 12). Though 
it has been fourteen years since a military leader ruled Argentina, the memories of 
this horrible episode in their history remain strong in the minds of the Argentine 
people. The effects of the brutal, repressive regime and its actions are still felt 
within Argentine society. Yet, Argentina is a different country than it was in 1983. 
The people, society, and even the military have changed as the political 
environment has been reshaped. 
To meet the aforementioned criteria of practically no risk of a return to 
military rule, Argentina has had to confront this dark chapter in its history. It is, 
however, difficult to say to what extent this has occurred. As previously mentioned, 
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when prosecution for criminal acts committed by the junta and its officers began in 
the 1980's, military rebellion was threatened. The Carapintada rebellion was a 
direct result of what some in the military considered unjust persecution of men who 
were only following orders in what they considered a war. Even members of the 
Catholic church had reinforced this belief by telling military officers "that it was 
necessary to eliminate them (the "disappeared"), that war was war." (Long 07/04/95 
AI8). 
Some level of resolution has occurred in the past ten years that, while not 
closing this painful chapter, has relieved the tension between military and civilian 
leadership. The laws of Due Obedience and Final Stop, enacted under Alfonsin to 
pardon or free from any possible future imprisonment those accused or convicted of 
such crimes, have been maintained even though tested greatly in recent years. 
Carlos Menem has made it clear that he intends no further prosecution of those who 
participated in the disappearing of Argentine citizens; shortly after taking office, he 
even amnestied some high-ranking officers who were jailed before the laws took 
effect. 
The issue of how great were the atrocities was brought back to the forefront 
of Argentine news in 1995, when a former Naval officer came forward to confess 
his crimes. The Argentine government had adopted a policy of forgetfulness, and 
the Argentine military had never admitted to the means which it had used to abduct, 
interrogate, torture, and kill those who disappeared during the "Dirty War". When 
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fonner Navy captain Arturo Scilingo confessed to Horacio Verbitsky of the 
Argentine newspaper PaiIDa 12 that he had taken part in the death flights where, 
according to admiral Luis Maria Mendia, "subversives (were) transported by plane, 
and not all (reached) their destinations," the horrible period was brought under 
examination once again (Husarska 12). Captain Scilingo confessed that he not only 
knew Argentines were being murdered, he flew on two separate flights and even 
pushed some of the disappeared to their deaths according to the book The Flisht by 
Verbitsky. His confession was immediately dismissed by President Menem who 
said that "the Argentine people do not want to continue hearing criminals who acted 
under the protection of a military dictatorship. To go out and make these kinds of 
charges publicly is to again stick the knife in a wound we are trying to heal. To me 
it is aberrant and repugnant." (Escobar 04/03/95 AI4). 
Menem's statement was no doubt influenced by the approaching election at 
the time of these events in March, 1995, but still, it exemplifies the attitude of the 
government over the past ten years. There is a strong desire on the part of those in 
power to forget, even if the crimes of the past can never be forgiven. The military 
officers have been encouraged by Menem to "confess to a priest and the chapter is 
closed." (Husarska 14). His reaction is even more drastic considering he was also 
imprisoned as a dissident during the "Dirty War"; he was held on a ship at the time 
according to what he told Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes in an interview that aired 
April 2, 1995 (Johnson 19). Menem made the statement that "through the window 
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of the ship, we could see with my companions how they brought in long lines of 
prisoners with their faces covered. And the cries of terror in the hold of the ship 
because of the tortures. Many were tortured for a long time and thrown out into the 
river. This is not something I was told about. This I have lived." (Johnson 19). 
Afterwards, Menem claimed that he had not personally witnessed the murders in the 
face of the obvious backlash against a President who knew of such brutal acts yet 
had himself pardoned the murderers who committed them. Truly, it appears he 
would rather forget what he himself witnessed than to keep the issue alive whether 
for his own political survival or the survival of Argentine democracy. 
Still, only one discredited naval officer confessing to alleged murders with 
no means of offering proof could be dismissed as a bitter desire to "rub salt in old 
wounds" (New York Times 04/26/95 A13). A month later, a second military 
officer, this time from the army, confessed to virtually the same crimes. Sergeant 
Victor Ibanez admitted to knowledge and participation in the interrogation of 
prisoners at Campo de Mayo army base in Buenos Aires and later drugging and 
murdering of the prisoners by throwing them out of airplanes and helicopters into 
the Atlantic Ocean (Los Angeles Times 04/28/95 A4). These almost identical 
confessions opened the floodgates of criticism against an armed forces that had said 
practically nothing for nearly two decades and suddenly had begun to speak .. The 
next day, the army Chief of Staff general Martin BaIza admitted that the military did 
"employ illegitimate methods, including the suppression of life," and that "the army 
-28-
did not know how to take on terrorists by legal means." (New York Times 04/26/95 
AI3). This was the frrst open admission of murder on the part of the military. 
Perhaps many would prefer to forget this chapter of Argentine history, but 
the past must be dealt with to some extent before a people can progress into the 
future. There are still many living, such as Hebe de Bonafini, the leader of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who cannot forget and will continue to ask for the 
release of the names and facts as to what occurred to their children and 
grandchildren as well as the names of those who committed the atrocities (Sims 
03/02/96 4). Yet, even the Mothers, who have been protesting weekly in the Plaza 
de Mayo for twenty years and demanding infonnation and justice, have changed 
their focus because as Argentine researcher Rosenda Fraga put it, "issues of 
unemployment and poverty are more important than what happened in the military's 
dirty war." (Sims 03/02/96 4). Another group who cannot forget is what has been 
labeled "The Lost Generation" (Larmer 39). These children of disappeared are 
teenagers and young adults who, after their parents were abducted, were placed in 
the homes of childless military and government officials. There has been a total of 
217 cases reported of which the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo have located 
51; of that number, 25 were returned to what remained of their original families and 
the rest either remained with their "adoptive parents" by mutual consent or still do 
not know defInitively who they are (Larmer 39). Though the number is small, these 
cases hang in the collective memory of the Argentine people as long as they remain 
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unresolved. Even so, progress has been made in some areas toward resolving some 
issues of the disappeared. Both the confession of militaty officers and general 
admission of guilt by general BaIza can be considered steps in the right direction. A 
court decision in 1994 that awarded $3 million to Daniel Tarnopolsky, the surviving 
son of two disappeared victims, with $1 million coming from the state and $1 
million from two fonner militaty chiefs of staff, Emilio Massera and Annando 
Lambruschini, whose connection to the murders had been previously established, 
can be considered "a victol)' for the 30,000 'disappeared' - for now." (Tarnopolsky 
12/12/94 AI9). While it may be painful to both the victims and those guilty of 
crimes to revisit such an awful period, "Argentina in time will be a politically 
healthier counil)' because the truth is at last seeing the light of day" (Los Angeles 
Times 04/28/95 B6). 
General Martin BaIza is cited as one of the best examples of the movement 
toward a society free from threat of militaty coup. He is considered an 
"Enlightened Chief of Staff" who, since taking over the anny in 1991, has brought 
the Argentine militaty to a higher level of professionalism and given it a greater 
respect for human rights and civilian control than it has ever had (New York Times 
10/27/95 A30). The anned forces has changed greatly since he took over; it is now 
an all-volunteer anny that includes women, and half the students at the Anny 
University are civilians(New York Times 10/27/95 A30). This is distinctly 
different from the militaty that once maintained its isolation from the rest of society. 
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There are several reasons for the fading of the Argentine military into the 
political background. The greatest is probably the reduction of its budget and size 
along with its role in internal issues. The military budget as a percentage of the 
Gross National Product has shrunk from 6% to under 2% since the democratic 
election of leaders resumed in 1983 (Sims 11/24/94 A3). The greatest risk 
concerning the military today may be that it becomes obsolete rather than whether it 
may overthrow the government. The size of the armed forces has also been reduced 
drastically. Today, there are slightly more than twenty thousand volunteer troops as 
opposed to the one hundred thousand conscripted members of fifteen years ago 
(Sims 11/24/94 A3). 
The diminished role of the Argentine military surely began after its failure 
during the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) War. After that humiliation and 
ensuing renunciation of power, the military has learned a lesson; "that military rule 
is bad, not only for the country but for them." (Economist 09/24/94 46). At the 
same time, the international environment has changed. During the 1960's and 70's, 
the Cold War encouraged a silent acceptance of the actions of the military by the 
western world as a means of combating Communism throughout Latin America. 
With the end of the Cold War, the international community has "lost its stomach for 
tinpot dictatorships" (Economist 09/24/94 46). Argentina has also prospered 
economically as it had never done under military rule. This has led to the 
international conclusion that drastic change would no longer be politically or 
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economically advantageous in Argentina. 
Probably the most prominent symbol of the changing attitude of the 
Argentine military is the conversion of the infamous Campo de Mayo army base, 
the largest in Argentina, to the International Peacekeeping Academy where young 
soldiers and officers are trained to serve as United Nations peacekeepers as they 
have done in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Haiti, Kuwait, Mozambique, Angola, 
and Western Sahara in recent years (Wright A21). The entire attitude of the officers 
running the camp as well as the environment of the camp itself has changed. The 
I 
founding commander of the academy calls it a "growth industry ... where we teach ~ 
I 
soldiers and officers how not to use force" and anyone is welcome at the academy 
that is located on a compound where a sign used to read "do not park, do not stop, 
or soldiers will shoot" (Wright A21). 
President Menem, along with more enlightened officers like General BaIza, 
has played a great role in reigning in a once out-of-control military. While reducing 
its role in society, he did maintain good political relations with the military through 
the pardoning of all convicted participants in the Dirty War. His control of the 
armed forces was evidenced last October when Defense Minister Jorge Donlinguez 
announced the resignations of three top officers: the head of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the head of the Navy, and the head of the Air Force in what was called 
"nothing more than a changing of the guard" (Sims 10/12/96 5). In the past, a 
drastic reshuffiing within the military elite would most likely have resulted in the 
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fear if not the occurrence of a coup attempt. Little was nlade of this power shift 
even in Argentina itself. The most significant fact was probably that General BaIza, 
who has been a strong supporter of the constitutional government was left in power 
while the others, who had been critical of the government, were removed. The role 
of the Argentine military seems finally to be in support of the civilian government 
along with protection of the borders and participation in international actions. No 
longer is the Argentine military a major player in national politics. Whether by 
choice or by design of the civilian leaders, the anny is now considered the "most 
subordinate to democratic rule in all South America" (Sims 11/24/94 A3). 
:1 !II 
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Criteria 2 
Political competition occurs within the system 
including two or more viable parties 
that can and do participate freely. 
Political competition has been limited in Argentina by the lack of free 
elections. F or almost thirty years, the Peronists were prohibited from participating, 
and during the BA regimes, all political parties were banned. There have 
traditionally been two powerful political parties in the Argentine system. The VCR 
(Radicals) is the older of the two parties originating in the early part of this century 
with Irigoyen. The P J (Peronists) began, obviously, with Juan Peron in the 1940's. 
The party of Peron still exists even after his death, though the principles of 
the party have changed since that time. It could be said that it is now the party of 
Menem. Since the renovation and rebirth of the P J in "the 1980's, the populist 
foundation of the previous forty years has been replaced with a liberal free-market 
economic stance. This took place during the period of greatest weakness for the P J. 
Raul Alfonsin was President, and the VCR was in power. The PJ was suffering 
from disorder and a total lack of credibility due to its failed government of the 
1970's and alleged deals made with the nlilitary regimes. The P J was seen as 
corrupt by the public and had less support than the VCR possibly for the fITst time 
in its existence. They reorganized, though, and used the unions that had always 
been their strongest backers to fight the Alfonsin government. Through strikes and 
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protests, along with strong criticism of Alfonsin's failures to control the economy, 
they undemrined the popularity of the UCR and gained prominence as the only 
viable alternative. 
With Menem as the leader of the once-again powerful political machine, the 
Peronists returned to power in 1989. The Radicals had several choices. They could 
have used illegitimate means to weaken Menem's government. They could have 
entered into secret pacts with the military to overthrow their opponents. They 
chose, however, to work within the system with the hope of regaining power in 
future elections. Such confidence in a constitutional government had never before 
existed in Argentina. A losing party that had the patience to wait six years for 
another election while working within the boundaries and standards of the system 
was evidence of the great strides made toward a stable democracy in Argentina. 
Menem proved to be popular during his first term. His success in reviving 
the country's suffering economy also brought great approval from the public. Still, 
the Argentine constitution permitted the President to serve only one term, and 
Menem wished to change this and compete for a second term in office. In 1993, the 
situation was unsure with congressional elections later that year and the presidential 
election still two years off. Obviously, the opposition U CR and its leader, former 
President Raul Alfonsin, were against any change that might allow the popular 
Menem to serve into the next century. Menem' s only hope at that point was to gain 
a two-thirds majority of both houses in the September elections in order to call a 
-35-
constitutional assembly to consider changes including a removal of the one-term 
limit (Economist 04/17/93 45). Most Argentines worry about granting too much 
control to anyone leader no matter how popular he has become. They have 
suffered at the hands of more popular men in the past, such as Juan Peron. The 
likelihood of Menem garnering support for a second term seemed slim at the time. 
When the elections of 1993 arrived, all parties knew the results could 
determine whether Menem would have the political power to become the frrst 
President since Peron to serve more than six years in office. The PJ won a crushing 
victory in the legislative elections, and Menem called a plebiscite on constitutional 
reform shortly thereafter in November (Economist 11/20/93 50). The Radicals 
were almost assured of losing the plebiscite. Still, the VCR held a minority large 
enough to block Menem from creating any constitutional assembly, but they would 
lose much support if they openly refused the express will of the people as would be 
demonstrated in the plebiscite (Economist 11/20/93 50). Instead, Alfonsin and 
Menem decided to work together and compromise, a rarity in Argentine politics. A 
package called the Olivos Pact was agreed upon by both sides that would call for 
concessions on the part of Menem in exchange for the support of Alfonsin and the 
Radicals for altering the constitution to permit a second term (Economist 10/20/93 
50). The pact resulted in the passage of legislation calling for a constitutional 
assembly. In return for the opportunity to lead Argentina for a second time, Menem 
had to make some changes desired by the VCR as well. The following package 
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includes the details to which both sides agreed: the presidential tenn was limited to 
four years instead of six with the advent of the second tenn (this began with 
Menem's second tenn, allowing him to serve until 1999); beginning with the next 
election, the President had to receive either 45% of the popular vote or 40% with a 
10% advantage over the next closest candidate to avoid a runoff; the position of 
prime minister was created; each province received one extra senator from the 
largest opposition party to bring the total to three; direct election replaced the 
electoral college system; the judiciary was given greater independence; and the 
Capital Federal was made autonomous (Gaiano 30 Sept). Alfonsin and the VCR 
shrewdly aided Menem while gaining these concessions to strengthen the other 
branches of government, and had they refused to deal, Menem would have most 
likely forced a constitutional change regardless. 
A vote on the constituent assembly was scheduled for April 10, 1994, and the 
two parties combined for 58% of the popular vote and 213 of the 305 assembly 
seats (Long 05/07/94 A2). The Peronists gave their incumbent President the 
opportunity to run again with the help of their pacted allies, the Radicals. As to the 
question of whether this change in the Argentine constitution was a healthy and 
progressive step for the nation, there is positively more than one answer, but the 
present response seems to be that it was not harmful and had a stabilizing effect. 
The status quo in politics was maintained for at least four more years, and that is 
something new in Argentina. The idea of one leader remaining in power in a 
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democracy for more than ten years is not without some precedents. During a 
similarly unstable time in United States history, Franklin Roosevelt served as 
President for thirteen years until his death, and France, Gennany, and Britain have 
all had democratically-elected leaders for greater periods of time (Economist 
04/16/94 17). 
The greatest argument in favor of the second tenn was the issue of economic 
progress, and most considered themselves to be better off than they were in the era 
of hyperinflation. In the words of one columnist, the "people say, 'so what, this is 
better than torture or inflation.'" (Tarnopolsky 05/18/95 A23). As the May 14, 
1995, elections approached, the greatest complaint was probably that the candidates 
looked the same. In the past, the parties had differed greatly, and political theory 
expressed had ranged from fascism to socialism. None of the serious candidates 
even proposed to reverse the free-market refonns that Menem had used to stabilize 
the economy (Economist 12/10/94 38). Many Argentines were still unhappy with 
their standard of living, and even more were troubled with the evidence of 
corruption in Menem' s party, but the Radicals who were "symbol( s) of 
hyperinflation" and practically echoing Menem's platform were not much of an 
option (Economist 12/10/94 43). Massaccesi, the UCR candidate, had even been 
accused of corruption on his own part; he was not the man to beat Menem. 
A new party fonned out of necessity through defections from both the 
Peronists and the Radicals. The two leaders of the Front for a Country in Solidarity 
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(Frepaso), Chacho Alvarez and Jose Bordon, were both Peronists who left the party 
due to unhappiness with Menem and the negative effects of his economic reforms 
(Long 03/18/95 A5). The Frepaso party stole any momentum the Radicals had by 
running on an anti-corruption campaign while backing economic reforms but with a 
softer touch. The Radicals had only one argument expressed in their television 
commercials which superimposed photos of Menem and the Frepaso presidential 
candidate, Bordon, and asked, "Don't they both look the same?" (Galetto 12). 
Menem won the presidential election with 50% of the popular vote, and he 
was trailed not by the Radicals but by the Bordon! Alvarez ticket with 30%; 
Massaccesi finished a distant third, the worst ever defeat for the Radicals with 17% 
(Epstein 07/03/96 6). Menem won through effective use of the media and by 
playing on the fears the Argentine people had of returning to instability. He may 
not have won any awards for efficiency or frugality, but his spending on advertising 
and campaigning kept him in the lead. It is estimated that the PJ spent 
approximately $40-50 million on the elections, while the Radicals spent $15 million 
and Frepaso barely exceeded the $3.5 million allocated them by the government 
(Galetto 12). Menem also used an extremely strong argument when speaking of the 
election alternatives. He described the election as a choice between him and 
"economic chaos" which was exactly what Argentines feared most (Sims 05/14/95 
4). The only great economic problem facing Menem that could have tripped up his 
election campaign was Wlemployment which was greater than 12% at the time, but 
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his campaign promise was to eliminate the unemployment problem during his 
second term, and as Marcelina Doltan, a pensioner and Menem supporter, said, 
"People are out of work, ... but things simply work better. People have credit. Even 
the phones work." (Escobar 05/16/95 AI2). 
Menem criticized the press during and after the election for its open 
reporting of allegations of corruption in his family and his administration. Yet, 
many think that his coverage has helped him to become a popular personality by 
receiving "the same degree of exposure reserved for movie and television stars" 
which has permitted him to withstand criticism for building a golf course or buying 
a $66 million airplane (Sims OS/25/95 A 16). After all, celebrities are allowed a 
little more leeway in their spending excesses even if the money is that of the people. 
Carlos Menem manipulated the situation in his country with his charismatic 
personality and by doing so, won a second term as President that many would have 
considered impossible only two years earlier. 
To this point, it seems as if the Peronists have once again controlled politics 
as they did between military governments in the 60's and 70's. One must remember 
that the P J was the second party to claim the presidential office after the second BA 
regime ended. They have ridden the tide of general economic prosperity and the 
popularity of their candidate into a second consecutive term, but future elections are 
very much open to the Radicals as well as Frepaso or other parties and coalitions 
that might form between now and the 1999 elections. 
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The 1996 mayoral election in Buenos Aires, the frrst time the city chose its 
own mayor, provided one example that Argentina has more than one viable political 
party. The P J for the frrst time had control of both houses of Congress and the 
Presidency as 1995 ended (Econontist 12/09/95). Had it not been for continued 
problems with unemployment, one would think the Menem administration had little 
to worry about in an election off-year. Problems began for the party, though, when 
Gustavo Beliz left the Peronists to run for mayor on the New Leadership party 
ticket with the support of Jose Bordon, fonner Peronist party member and Frepaso 
candidate for President (Economist 02/17/96). Beliz accused Menem and the PJ of 
running a corrupt political machine, though he may have been disgruntled that there 
was no open primary to decide the P J candidate for the June 30 elections. The 
incumbent Peronist mayor, Jorge Dominguez, ran against Fernando de la Rna of the 
UCR and Norberto La Porta of Frepaso, who ran without the support of Bordon. In 
a great defeat for the PJ, de la Rna won with 40% of the vote, La Porta finished 
second with 27010 and Dominguez fmished a very distant third with only 18% 
(Epstein 07/03/96 6). In one year, the P J had gone from frrst to last. It did not help 
their situation that new unemployment figures released two days before the 
elections reported another increase to 17.1 %, nor did the continuing shadow of 
corruption and excess about which de la Rua said, "The enemy is the Menentist 
culture of frivolity, arrogance, pizza and champagne." (Epstein 07/03/96 6). 
Since that time, much debate has taken place as to what will occur next in the 
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ongoing saga of Argentine politics as the 1999 elections approach. Some have 
speculated that Menem will again try to change the constitution to pennit him to run 
for a third term, but the more likely theory is that he would like to hand the reins 
over to a Peronist successor and run again in 2003. The most popular candidate at 
this time appears to be Eduardo Duhalde, the governor of Buenos Aires province, 
but former economic minister Domingo Cavallo, who enjoys great popularity for 
masterminding the economic strategies of Menem' s first term, as well as several 
other politicians, like Raul Alfonsin, whose faces keep reappearing could challenge 
for the Presidency (Halper 18). Without a doubt, the election is far from a sure 
thing for anyone. In fact, it is a wide open race that demonstrates the extent to 
which political competition can and does occur and shows how far Argentina has 
come in just ten years. 
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Criteria 3 
The economy has stabilized to the point of becoming nlanageable. 
Economic strategies can be developed in the long tenn 
rather than solely as crisis management techniques. 
Though Argentina has made great strides in controlling its military and in 
allowing political competition, the most progress has probably occurred in the 
economic sector. When Carlos Menem took office after Alfonsin resigned in 1989, 
the economy was arguably one of the world's worst. The Argentine Austral was 
virtually worthless as hyperinflation caused almost daily devaluation. The people 
had no confidence in their government to control the situation. Menem had run 
under the message, "For the hunger of poor children, for the sadness of rich 
children, for the young and the old, with the flag of God, which is faith, and the flag 
of the people, which is the Fatherland, for God, I ask you: follow me. I will not 
deceive you," and was thus labeled "Peron with sideburns" (Economist 11/26/94 
SI). Menem was elected on the strength of the working class's renewed support for 
Peronism and the P J. Once elected, though, he has redefined the Peronist label, and 
some say, has showed himself to not be a Peronist at all. 
Menem's economics have been purely free-market. He has supported a strict 
policy of privatization of industry along with an end to government-supported social 
programs. In fact, his allegiance to North American economics has been so 
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strong that the United States ambassador has been nicknamed "the viceroy" 
(Economist 11/26/94 S4). Menem did not refer to his government bureaucrats or 
public-sector advisers for economic suggestions. Instead he turned to Bunge y 
Born, the largest private company in Argentina (Gaiano 30 Sept). More 
importantly, in 1991, he appointed Domingo Cavallo as the finance minister 
(Economist 11/26/94 S4). 
Domingo Cavallo deserves as much credit, and probably more, as Menem or 
anyone else in reviving the Argentine economy. His economic plans, shrewdness, 
and political will were exactly what Argentina needed to free itself of the 20,266% 
inflation rate peak of March 1990 (Economist 11/26/94 S4). The Cavallo Plan, as it 
was called, focused on reducing inflation and stabilizing the economy to improve 
international confidence. The various factors included balancing the budget, fixing 
the exchange rate, and banning the printing of currency to cover budget deficits 
(Economist 07/24/93 46). The most important part of the plan was the 
Convertibility Plan. Beginning in April 1991, every peso, which was the new 
currency that replaced the Austral, in circulation had to be backed by the central 
bank's gold and foreign-exchange reserves (Economist 11/26/94 S4). Inflation 
plummeted immediately, and has remained low and stable for the past six years. 
The fact that the rate has been below 1% during that period is incredible for a 
country that hadn't consistently seen anything less than triple digit inflation in over 
a decade (Economist 11/26/94 S4). 
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The Convertibility Plan stabilized the economy and allowed Menem to 
concentrate on a longer-tenn strategy of privatization. At the same time, Menem 
began removing government protections of industry. By doing so, he opened 
Argentine markets to foreign investment. Import tariffs were reduced from 50% to 
10%, and foreign investment from 1990-93 totaled almost $25 billion (Economist 
11/26/94 S5). Argentina experienced a boom with sustained growth that rivaled 
even the Southeast Asian cOWltries. The Gross Domestic Product rose at a rate of 
almost 8% a year for the first half of this decade (Epstein 07/24/96 9). 
All was not perfect, though. The fixed currency put a burden on exporters 
who fOWld their peso overvalued in comparison to foreign currencies. As a result, 
imports were cheaper and put a strain on Argentine businesses to be more 
productive and more competitive at a lower price. Electricity prices dropped by 
30% after privatization, and labor productivity in manufacturing rose by more than 
40% (Economist 11/26/94 S5). 
Growth in the economy was not creating jobs either. The Argentine worker, 
long protected by refonns that dated back to Peron, was working harder and with 
less security. In fact, Wlemployment was rising almost as rapidly as inflation 
disappeared. Businesses had only one choice to become profitable, and that was to 
shrink their oversized workforce. Restructuring and downsizing were even more 
evident in businesses that had been privatized. In the past, when Wlemployment 
became a problem, the government had simply hired more people, thus creating an 
-45-
inefficient and oversized public sector workforce (Economist 11/26/94 S 14). When 
these companies entered the private sector, many released up to 90% of their 
workers. These unemployed laborers were left jobless in a competitive market 
where "lawyers and engineers apply to drive taxis, architects and accountants to 
answer phones or hand out promotional flyers on street comers" (Almeida 7). Even 
those lucky enough to find new jobs were underemployed. The unemployment rate 
rose from 6% before the Cavallo Plan was instated to over 12% at the time of the 
1995 presidential elections (Sims 05/16/95 AI3). 
One would think a president could not win an election in a country where the 
unemployment rate had doubled during his first tenn, but even so, most Argentines 
were more comfortable with Menem' s refonns than with the possibility of change 
that other candidates might bring. In fact, with Menem winning by twenty 
percentage points, some called the election a "ringing endorsement for his economic 
agenda" (Sims 05/16/95 A13). Businessmen inside and out of the country also were 
more comfortable with Menem and free market economics. The country was 
recovering from the aftereffects of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. The "tequila 
effect" that resulted throughout Latin America scared off most investors and caused 
$7.5 billion in bank deposit withdrawals between January and April of 1995 (Taylor 
51). Again Cavallo saved the Argentine economy. He managed to immediately 
negotiate an international credit package totaling $5 billion to help the economy 
recover (Taylor 51). With Menem reelected, the economy stabilized, yet the 
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unemployment situation continued to worsen. Argentina fell into a recession and 
experienced a budget deficit in the frrst half of 1996 totaling $2.51 billion (Sims 
07/29/96 AS). The economy also shrank for the frrst time in almost five years. 
Cavallo received much of the criticism for the country remaining stagnant 
throughout the frrst half of 1996. Menem had supported Cavallo while his 
economic measures had been successful and popular, but as popularity waned, 
Menem also became a critic. Cavallo had been successful by standing up to 
organized labor, fanners, and other interest groups, but without some political 
support, he could not weather the stonn of criticism he was now receiving. After 
the P J fwished last in the Buenos Aires mayoral elections, the blame was passed to 
Cavallo, especially since he had just announced a new unemployment figure of 
17.1 % (Epstein 07/03/96 6). Cavallo became the target of much criticism from 
within the PJ who complained that break-off factions of the party, like Frepaso, 
were beating it in elections like the mayoral race because the country had put its 
economic fate in the hands of a free market disciple like Cavallo. 
The man who had rebuilt the Argentine economy was dismissed on July 26, 
1996, and replaced by Roque Fernandez (Pastor & Wise 19). The decision was not 
an unpopular one, nor was the response that followed panicked as many thought it 
might turn out to be. 70% of those who responded to a poll by the major Argentine 
newspaper, Clarin, said that they approved of the frring of Cavallo (Sims 07/29/96 
AS). Bankers and the stock market also responded positively to his replacement, 
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especially since Menem also assured everyone that general policy would remain 
unchanged. Devaluation was probably the greatest worry of Argentine bankers 
because it would immediately lead to inflation, so most were relieved to know that 
Menem would not touch the Convertibility Plan. Argentina had reached the point 
where it thought it could progress without the guidance of its heretofore supreme 
economic leader. As one economist put it, "Stability is now in the blood of 
Argentines. Argentina has learned the hard way. Nobody wants to go back to the 
old policies. People know that regardless of who comes and goes, the model is not 
going to change." (Escobar 07/30/96 AI0). 
Fernandez quickly showed himself to be of the same economic philosophy as 
Cavallo, and being a University of Chicago graduate, few doubted that fact 
beforehand. Even the Catholic Church became vocal on behalf of the poor by 
supporting strikes and calling the government's economic program "against the 
church's social doctrine" after television stations broadcast pictures of poor people 
in the town of Rosario eating cats (Sims 07/29/96 AS). Still, in the face of great 
pressure to ease the strict economic policy the government had followed, Fernandez 
introduced a series of cost-cutting measures and tax increases. On August 12, 1996, 
Fernandez announced $4.5 billion in tax increases and spending cuts including a 
40% diesel fuel price increase and a proposal to raise the retirement age of women 
to 65 to make it the same as it now is for men (Economist 08/24/96 34). Bus drivers 
and truckers went on strike often over the next month. Small protests were 
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common, and some large protests were organized, such as one evening when the 
entire city of Buenos Aires became dark as virtually every business, home, and 
vehicle turned off its lights in protest against Menem and Fernandez's economic 
policies. 
The unions became more and more vocal in opposition of the leader they had 
helped elect. They considered his devotion to liberal economics a betrayal of the 
working Argentines especially as the unemployment rate topped off at 18.6% 
(Almeida 7). They planned a national response to show their strength and the level 
of anger many Argentines felt with their government. That response took place 
beginning on Thursday, September 27, 1996, and lasted into the weekend; Menem 
called the strike an opportunity for a "long weekend for union members" (Rotella 
10/27/96 A9). Regardless of the reason, the strike obviously garnered much 
support from the working class. Television polls showed that over 84% of 
employees supported the strike, and local estimates were that 80·90% of workers 
stayed home on Thursday and Friday (Sims 10/28/96 4). Almost every bank in 
Buenos Aires was closed and travel within the city was nearly impossible as 
thousands of protesters were bused in from outlying areas and other towns. These 
protesters met with groups from within the city at the Plaza de Mayo in front of the 
president's house where they stayed, all seventy thousand of them, through Friday 
afternoon (Sims 10/28/96 4). Most of these protests were related to the 
unemployment situation, but that had been a problem for the past few years. 
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The specific point of contention causing the unions to strike was the new 
health plan and worker "flexibility" plan Menem had been proposing. Under the 
flexibility plan, businesses would be able to change workers' hours and vacation 
times to fit production needs as well as release workers without paying extremely 
high unemployment costs. Unemployment compensation was so high that it 
discouraged businesses from adding new workers. An employer was required to 
pay one month of salary to an employee for each year of service, with a minimum 
of three months' income (Artana All). The changes to the health plans were a 
greater problem for unions. Health plans in Argentina are run and funded by unions 
and payments to the unions from workers. The unions include approximately 70% 
of Argentine workers, and collect $60 million a month in dues; they collect $200 
million a month for their health plans (Friedland & Patino A 12). Obviously, 
removing the health plans from union control would remove a large portion of union 
funds and influence. Employees can now choose among different union-operated 
health insurers, but the long-tenn goal is to open the health insurance industry to all 
providers (Artana All). 
Ironically for Cavallo, it seems the strict policies he backed to his end 
and that Fernandez has stuck with are allowing Argentina to grow once again, after 
all. The country seems to have recovered from its recession and is back on its 
steady-growth path. Unemployment has peaked, it appears, and is now heading 
downward slowly. It now sits in the 16 ... 17% range and the Gross Domestic Product 
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grew by approximately 9% in the last quarter of 1996 (Artana All). Mercosur, the 
free trade union including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay is expanding 
possibly to include Peru and is approaching $1 trillion in Gross Domestic Product 
(Economist 11/26/94 S7). Argentina is expected to grow at a rate of 4-5% over the 
next few years, and should this occur, Argentina will enter the new millennium with 
a healthy stable economy and a strong peso (Artana All). Should unemployment 
also drop, possibly below the 10% level for the first time in more than five years, 
Menem will have worked a second economic miracle to complete his second term. 
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Criteria 4 
Primary problems faced by the original transition government 
have been at least partially resolved, shifting focus to secondary 
problems resulting from the strategies used to solve said primary issues. 
The major challenges facing Argentine democracy and stability have 
changed in the last fifteen years. Argentina has progressed from a country tom by 
undeclared civil war and ruled by military dictators to a constitutional democracy 
run by elected officials who must answer to the people on a regular basis. Surely, 
there are problems with the current system, and there are almost definitely new 
crises that will arise to threaten what the Argentines have constructed. The point is 
that the problems are different ones, and the crises that could have destroyed 
Argentine democracy have been dealt with or at least brought under control. The 
situation that will be faced by the new President who follows Menem in 1999 will 
most definitely be different than what Raul Alfonsin encountered in 1983. More 
importantly, though problems exist, the country is much more stable, the economy 
is under better control, and Argentine politics are freer now than they were then and 
possibly than they have ever been. 
Though some problems have been resolved, others do exist that still must be 
dealt with for Argentina to continue to progress. These problems that have arisen or 
grown in importance as others have faded into the background are secondary 
problems. They are no less important, nor should they demand less attention. They 
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simply could not have existed at all or to the same degree under the previous 
regime, and their presence or gain in importance is the result of the policies and 
actions of the transitional governments. They are the main challenges facing a 
consolidating democracy, and they distinguish a consolidating democracy from the 
transitional government that preceded it. In Argentina, these problems have been 
arising for approximately the past five years. While some were problems before 
this, in this time they have moved from the background to the fore. They are now 
the subjects that occupy the headlines of the Argentine papers. 
To begin with, Argentina had to deal with the past before it could progress 
into the future. When Alfonsin took over in 1983, he still faced the threat of a 
strong military that, though stung by its failure in power, could choose to return to 
power at any moment. That military, as discussed previously, is no longer so 
powerful or menacing as to be a realistic threat. The primary problem of military 
overthrow has been removed. A secondary problem arose, during the 1980's and 
has continued throughout this decade. It's visibility reached a high point in the 
spring of 1995. 
This secondary problem is the question of how to deal with the crimes 
committed during the military regime. As Alfonsin discovered in the '80's, this 
problem couldn't be resolved by a transitional government. The issues were still too 
recent, and the military still operated at a level above the law. Human rights groups 
like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have been calling for some form of justice 
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for twenty years. It is defmite now that even members of that regime who have 
confessed to horrible murders will never be punished. Still, steps can be taken to 
put these issues to rest. A full release of the names of those who disappeared, if 
available, would be a giant fast step. More military officials like Anny Chief of 
Staff General BaIza who have come forward and condemned the actions of their 
predecessors would help ease the pain of those who suffer. Most likely, the only 
solution Argentina will achieve will be the result of time. No, Argentines should not 
forget what happened in the 1970's, but for the nation to continue to move forward, 
these issues must be left behind. 
The military is no longer a menace to Argentine society. It is less than one 
fifth its previous size as stated earlier. The paternalistic mentality of the military is 
as outdated as those who once believed that way. There is no justification for nor 
evidence of a military threat to Argentine democracy. The only challenge left is to 
maintain civilian control of the armed forces and to keep the military in its proper 
place in a democracy, as the defender of its nation from external enemies. So long 
as this is achieved, Argentina is among the most stable nations in Latin America. 
The second challenge that arose in Argentina appeared in 1994 and 
continues. It is the question of whether Argentina can truly maintain a multiparty 
system. Currently there are three strong political parties, the PJ, the VCR, and 
Frepaso. What must be prevented is the deterioration of this system to the point 
where one party controls the political workings of the country with little true 
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democracy. The PJ has been the dominant party of the consolidation. Since 1989, 
they have won a majority of local and national elections. When Carlos Menem 
made public his desire to run for a second term, many saw it as a threat to 
democracy in Argentina. Some even said that Menem wanted to be king of 
Argentina. It very well could have resulted in that, except that the reworking of the 
Constitution took place in such a manner as to strengthen the minority party in 
Congress. It granted greater control of politics to the legislative branch, and it 
removed much of the power of the President to govern by decree, as Menem had 
done in his fIrst six years. 
Still, many argued that Argentine democracy was threatened by a too-
powerful Peronist party with little threat from the weakened and disorganized 
Radicals. The appearance of Frepaso demonstrated that Argentine politics would 
continue to be extremely competitive. Frepaso grew out of discontent with the 
Peronist party, and the splinter group soon became a strong force in national 
politics. They have since beaten the P J in the mayoral elections in Buenos Aires, 
the nation's largest city. Menem has also not been all-powerful as some feared he 
would. Even with a majority in both houses of Congress, he has struggled to pass 
many bills. He is no king, and as the 1999 elections approach, some have even 
begun to use the term lame duck, though that is probably an exaggeration. Were he 
to alter the Constitution once again to run for a third term, one could consider his 
presence a serious threat to Argentine democracy, but with approval ratings at the 
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20% level, he has none of the support to make such a change as he did in 1995 
(Rotella 10/17/96 All). As he leaves office in 1999, Argentina will make a 
transition to the 21 at century and win be one step closer to the level of stable 
democracy previously achieved only by Western democracies in the Northern 
hemisphere. 
Corruption has become a major issue in Argentine politics. Previously, it 
was not considered a major issue as all politicians were considered corrupt. It was 
almost a requirement that powerful politicians be able to cut back-room deals with 
labor leaders or big industrialists. As the country has upped its standard of living it 
has upped its standards for its politicians. It expects free politics to also be clean. 
Several scandals have occurred in the past year that have raised public awareness of 
corruption in high places. These scandals have also brought on a wave of criticism 
of President Menem and many of his top ministers. 
The man who has probably been most influential in focusing Argentines on 
corruption is Domingo Cavallo. The former economy minister has been a crusader 
against government corruption since being fIred last year. Many say he is 
disgruntled or that he is simply attempting to further his own political ambitions; he 
is running for Congress this year and could quite possibly attempt to run for 
President in 1999(Economist 10/26/96 50). Still, the result has been that several 
corruption schemes -have been uncovered, and Argentine politicians are seriously 
talking of cleaning up the system for the fIrst time. President Menem has even 
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appointed a special administrator to the customs service as well as investigative 
commissions to examine its dealings due to reports of over $10 billion in goods and 
merchandise smuggled into the country through an "underground customs 
operation" (LaFranchi 6). 
Cavallo has also exposed at least one bribety case himself that included a 
major multinational corporation and a state-run bank. He accused IBM of bribing 
officials at the Banco de la Nacion as they were planning to upgrade the data-
processing systems there in order to obtain the $256 million contract that some have 
called the biggest single computer contract in Latin American histoty (Economist 
10/26/96 50). He also accused Menem's chief of staff, Alberto Kohan, of knowing 
of the deal while it happened and of "mafias" existing within the government that 
were the biggest threat to Argentine progress (LaFranchi 6). Truly, for Argentime 
democracy to gain credibility, it cannot be seen as riddled with criminals and deal-
brokering puppets of business or labor. Most likely, these problems will not bring 
down the President, though they may destroy many other high-ranking officials. 
Regardless, they are not a great threat to democracy in general. They may even 
result in a stronger system if corruption can be sufficiently discouraged and 
punished. Probably, the elections of 1999 will bring in a presidential candidate who 
advocates the successful economic policies of the past ten years along with a strong 
anti-corruption campaign. Most likely, the people will back this type of candidate, 
whether it be Cavallo or some lesser-known name, because they grow tired of the 
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continued scandals of the past year which show no sign of letting up. As this 
happens, Argentina must maintain its course, and the country will continue to move 
forward and past this ugly yet necessary political cleansing period. 
The economy has shown one of the most easily identifiable shifts from 
primary to secondary problems. From 1983-89, the greatest economic problem 
facing Alfonsin was, without a doubt, inflation. It ranged in the triple digits for the 
fIrst few years of his term and then ballooned to the unmeasurable levels of 
hyperinflation. His administration could have no long-term plan for economic 
stability as it moved from one inflation-crisis solution, and subsequent devaluation, 
to another. 
Beginning in 1991 with the Cavallo Plan, the era of inflation ended in 
Argentina. The change was so drastic that other problems were created by the 
severe drop in inflation to less than 1%. At the same time, the country was 
following a plan of privatization, but growth was inhibited by the strict control of 
the economy. Loans were not forthcoming, and businesses could not afford to 
expand. Most actually cut their workforce to stay profitable in the newly 
competitive market. The result has been a tripling of the unemployment rate over 
the past six years from 6% to 18% as mentioned in the last chapter. This problem 
did not exist in 1989, and it was most defInitely caused by the harsh strategies used 
by Cavallo and Menem. The country has yet to deal with this large problem, as 
unemployment still hovers in the mid-teens, but many indications have shown that 
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Argentina is pulling out of its recession. With the growth of 4-5% projected by 
most analysts and the largest privatization actions complete, the unemployment rate 
should stabilize and begin to decrease. The big question is whether it will do so 
quickly enough. With approximately 45% of the working-age population 
unemployed, underemployed, or not earning enough to meet subsistence needs, how 
long can the country remain stable (LaFranchi 6)? As has been demonstrated 
during the past several years though, these economic problems can be controlled 
with sound policy and political determination. This will probably be the largest 
problem and the greatest requirement of 'the next President of Argentina. 
Still, though the next President of Argentina will be presented with great 
challenges and numerous obstacles to overcome, he will not have to deal with the 
problems of the past of military coups, guerrilla fighting, and economic collapse. 
His problems will be different. They will be 'the problems more of a developed 
nation, developed both politically and economically., Argentina is moving in that 
direction and shows no real indication of turning back as it approaches the twenty-
first century. 
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